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Developing countries pay substantially higher transportation costs than developed nations, which leads
to less trade and perhaps lower incomes. This paper investigates price discrimination in the shipping
industry and the role it plays in determining transportation costs. In the presence of market power,
shipping prices depend on the demand characteristics of goods being traded. We show theoretically
and estimate empirically that shipping firms charge higher prices when transporting goods with higher
product prices, lower import demand elasticities, and higher tariffs, and when facing fewer competitors
on a trade route. These characteristics explain more variation in shipping prices than do conventional
proxies such as distance, and significantly contribute to the higher shipping prices facing the developing
world. Markups increase shipping prices by at least 83 percent for the mean shipment in Latin American
imports. Our findings are also important for evaluating the impact of tariff liberalization. Shipping
firms decrease prices by 1-2 percent for every 1 percent reduction in tariffs.
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I. Introduction 
 
Trade and development economists have become increasingly focused on trade barriers and 
the costs of remoteness.  Geographically remote countries trade less, and this appears to reduce both 
the level (Redding and Venables, 2004) and growth rate (Frankel and Romer, 1999) of income.  
While we do not know precisely why remoteness matters, an obvious possibility is that isolated 
countries face significantly higher transportation costs. 
Table 1 provides data on transportation costs for imports into the US and a number of Latin 
American countries, and makes clear several basic facts about costs of trade.  One, ad valorem 
transport costs are negatively correlated with per capita income – they are 1.5-2.5 times higher for 
Latin American importers than for the United States, and systematically higher for low income 
exporters into a given import market.   
Two, transport costs are comparable in size to, or larger than, tariffs.  For the median good 
in US imports transportation represents 85 percent of the total costs (transport plus tariffs) faced by 
an exporter.  For Latin American importers, transportation costs represent from 31 to 63 percent of 
total costs faced by exporters in the median good.   
Three, despite the fact that international transportation technology and the use of 
containerized liner shipping is common across goods and exporters, transportation costs vary 
enormously.  For US imports, the coefficient of variation (across exporters and goods) in ad-
valorem transportation costs is 1.4, meaning that shipments with costs that are one-standard 
deviation above the mean have costs 140 percent greater than the mean.   Even if we hold constant 
the product in question there is tremendous variation in transport costs across exporters to a given 
market.  For US imports, the exporter one standard deviation above the mean pays shipping prices 
89 percent higher than the mean.  Variability in Latin America is comparable to or higher than the 
US.  Given their size and variability, transportation costs are likely to play an especially important 
role in changing relative prices – lowering trade volumes in the aggregate and altering patterns of 
trade across goods and partners.   
In this paper we investigate the hypothesis that the exercise of market power by shipping 
companies can help explain the level of shipping costs, their variability across goods and exporters, 
and critically, can provide insights into why costs are higher for developing countries.  If correct, 
transportation costs should not be viewed as some exogenously set friction that limits trade, as is   2 
most commonly assumed when adopting the “iceberg” formulation.  Rather, transportation costs are 
a barrier to trade that, like tariffs, are amenable to reduction through concerted policy action. 
There are two reasons to suspect the exercise of market power might be especially important 
in international shipping.  First, minimum efficient scale in shipping is significant.  The capacity of 
a modern container ship is large relative to the export volumes produced by smaller countries, and 
there are substantial economies of scope in offering transport services over a network of ports.  One 
way to see this effect is to calculate the number of liner shipping firms operating on a particular 
trade route.  In the fourth quarter 2006 one in six importer-exporter pairs world-wide was served by 
a single liner “service”, meaning that only one ship was operating on that route.  Over half of 
importer-exporter pairs were served by three or fewer ships, and in many cases all of the ships on a 
route were owned by a single shipping firm.
1  Figure 1 plots the number of shipping firms operating 
between a given exporter and the US, graphed against the GDP of the exporter.  Trade routes 
involving larger countries have higher trade volumes, more ships and more liner companies 
operating on them.   
Second, even on trade routes with multiple firms operating, the ferocity of competition is in 
question.  Shipping companies on densely traded routes are organized into cartels known as liner 
conferences that discuss shipping prices and market shares.  The role of market power in shipping 
has been a long standing concern in policy circles (see Fink et al 2000 for a recent review).  More 
recently, the European Union Competitiveness Council concluded that cartelization had led to a less 
competitive shipping market and higher shipping prices, and repealed a block exemption to its 
competition laws for liner conferences.
2  Beginning in 2008 liner firms serving the EU will no 
longer be able to meet in conferences or to collude in setting prices and market share.  
But are these concerns valid?  The existence of liner conferences does not prove that they 
collude successfully nor indicate how much lower shipping prices would be in their absence.  A 
theoretical literature on contestability argues that a small number of shipping lines serving a 
particular route is not prima facie evidence of market power, so long as entrants stand ready to 
                                                 
1 Data extracted by the Port2Port evaluation tool, www.compairdata.com, December 2006.   
2 Commissioner Charlie McCreevy, who handled the proposal, said “The European shipping industry will benefit from 
the more competitive market that will result from the repeal of the block exemption and the EU economy as a whole 
stands to benefit from lower transport prices and more competitive exports.” EU Press Release IP/05/1249.   3 
compete away monopoly profits (Davies, 1986).  For example, tramp shipping services may act as a 
kind of competitive fringe disciplining the pricing behavior of liner companies.
3   
The direct evidence linking shipping prices to market power is mixed.  Clyde and Reitzes 
(1995) find no statistically significant relationship between shipping prices and the market share of 
conferences serving on a route.  Fink et al (2000) find that shipping prices are higher in the presence 
of price-fixing agreements by conferences.  Both papers rely on US imports data and, given the 
large volumes of cargo and many competitors operating on US trade routes, the results may not be 
representative of the shipping industry worldwide.  In addition, the test of market power in both 
papers relies on variation in liner conference activity across trade routes, and this poses significant 
identification problems.  That is, liner conferences may drive up shipping prices through collusive 
behavior, or liner conferences may be especially active on routes where shipping prices are likely to 
be high for other reasons.   
In this paper we provide a test of market power in the shipping industry that links shipping 
price variation to characteristics of products.  This test enables us to identify how much variation in 
shipping prices across goods and across markets is due to market power.  In addition, we are able to 
show how market power leads to systematically higher shipping prices in the developing world and 
to calculate their impact on trade flows. 
We model the shipping industry as a Cournot oligopoly with a fixed number of firms, and 
determine optimal shipping markups as a function of the number of firms and the elasticity of 
transportation demand faced by firms.  A key insight of the model is that transportation is not 
consumed directly; instead shipping firms face transportation demand derived indirectly from 
import demand.  This implies that the impact of an increased shipping markup on the demand for 
transportation depends on the share of transportation costs in the delivered price of the good, and 
elasticity of import demand.  Both vary considerably across goods, and we can use this variation to 
identify whether shipping firms exercise market power. 
To make plain the intuition behind the model, suppose the marginal cost of shipping either 
of two goods equals $10, and shippers are considering adding a $5 markup.  The first good has a 
factory price of $10, so the markup will increase the delivered price by 25%.  The second good has 
a factory price of $90, so the markup increases the delivered price by 5%.  The same shipping 
markup has a much larger effect on the delivered price of the $10 good because shipping costs 
                                                 
3 Tramp shipping represented 17 percent of US waterborne import cargoes by value (and 5 percent of containerized 
value) in 2002, author’s calculations from US Waterborne Imports database, 2002.   4 
represent a larger share of the delivered price.   Holding fixed marginal costs of transportation, the 
optimal markup charged by a shipping firm is then increasing in product prices. 
Several previous papers have used this intuition as a simple test of market power in 
shipping.
4  If the marginal cost of transport is independent of the price of the good shipped, and 
markets are competitive, then the prices charged by shipping firms should also be independent of 
goods prices.   Since shipping prices are positively correlated with goods prices in the data, 
previous authors have concluded that market power is being exercised.  The problem with this logic 
is that marginal costs of transportation are likely not independent of goods prices.  There is a wide 
range of transport service quality available to exporters.  Faster ships, direct routing, and more 
careful handling are all available at a premium, and are more likely to be demanded for the transport 
of higher quality goods.
5  Shipping prices also include insurance charges that are surely increasing 
in the value of the goods shipped.  That is, one would expect to see a positive correlation between 
goods prices and shipping prices even if shipping markets were highly competitive. 
Happily our model delivers two more testable implications that do not suffer this 
identification problem.  First, when considering the impact of shipping prices on the delivered price 
of goods, it is necessary to examine product prices inclusive of tariffs.  Raising the tariff on a good 
raises its price, lowers the percentage impact of a given transportation charge on the delivered price, 
and therefore increases the optimal shipping markup.  The impact on the markup operates through 
precisely the same channel as an increase in prices due to product quality, except that increasing 
tariffs does not affect the demand for higher quality transportation.  If we find a positive 
relationship between tariffs and shipping prices we can attribute this to market power, and not to 
variation in the marginal cost of shipping.  This channel also suggests a particularly deleterious role 
for tariffs in limiting trade.  Tariffs raise foreign goods prices directly by taxing them, and indirectly 
by inducing higher shipping prices, and both reduce trade flows. 
Our second testable implication relates to the responsiveness of trade to increased prices.  
Returning to our example above, now suppose we have two traded goods with a factory gate price 
of $90 and marginal costs of shipping equal to $10, so that a markup of $5 will yield an equal 5% 
increase in the delivered price of each good.  The first good is a differentiated product and faces an 
import demand elasticity equal to 1.1.  Here, a markup that yields a 5% increase in delivered price 
                                                 
4 Sjostrom (1992) reviews and critiques this literature. 
5 Hummels (2007) provides evidence for this claim in an instance, the use of air versus ocean transportation, where 
service quality differences can be directly observed.   5 
reduces traded quantities, and therefore demand for transportation services, by only 5.5%  The 
second good is a highly substitutable commodity and faces an import demand elasticity of 10.  
Here, the markup raises prices by 5% but lowers quantities traded and demand for transportation 
services by 50%!  In the latter case the identical markup reduces import (and therefore 
transportation) demand to a much greater degree, limiting the optimal markup for the shipping firm. 
Our model uses these simple insights to show how, conditional on the number of firms, 
optimal markups will be increasing in product price and tariffs, and decreasing in the absolute value 
of the import demand elasticity.   However, the impact of these factors is each lessened as the 
number of firms rises.  This provides us with the alternative hypothesis:  if shipping markets are 
sufficiently competitive then shipping firms are unable to exploit their market power to raise prices 
even in cases where the derived demand for transportation services is relatively inelastic. 
Our empirical work uses data on shipping prices derived from detailed imports data for the 
US and Latin America.  We relate shipping prices to variation across exporters and products in:  
cost shifters, product prices, tariffs, the elasticity of import demand, and the number of shippers.  
Our data confirm the theoretical predictions.  Price discriminating shippers charge higher markups 
on goods with high prices, high tariffs, and a low (absolute) import demand elasticity.   Particularly 
relevant from a policy perspective, a 1 percent increase in tariffs leads to an increase in 
transportation prices of 1-2 percent.  Having more shippers on a route directly lowers transportation 
prices, and reduces the effect of the import demand elasticity on prices.  This confirms that price 
discrimination is substantially weakened in the presence of more competition.    
We show that the exercise of market power is responsible for a large portion of the observed 
variation in shipping costs across goods and exporters.  In the US sample, goods with an import 
demand elasticity of 3.2 face shipping prices that are, ceteris paribus, 43 percent higher than goods 
with an import demand elasticity of 16.5.  In the Latin American sample, goods subject to a 23 
percent ad-valorem tariff face shipping prices that are 36 percent higher than those goods subject to 
no tariff.  Exporters served by only two shipping firms face shipping prices that are 22 percent 
larger than exporters in which there are 8 firms competing. 
Market power helps explain higher ad-valorem shipping prices faced by developing 
countries.    On average, non-OECD exporters pay 48 percent more than OECD exporters when 
shipping into the US, and 39 percent more when shipping into Latin America.  More than half of 
this effect is explained by differences in product prices with a relatively minor role played by   6 
simple measures of market access like distance.  Shipping prices on Latin American imports are, on 
average, 25.7 percent higher than shipping prices on US imports.  One-third of this difference is 
explained by the small number of shippers serving Latin American importers.  Another half of the 
difference is due to much higher tariffs on Latin American imports that allow shipping firms room 
to charge higher markups.  
Finally, we provide a back of the envelope calculation of what shipping prices and trade 
volumes would be if markups on all traded goods were equal to the smallest markups observed in 
the data.  For the US, the mean (across goods and exporters) response would be a 34.6 percent 
reduction in shipping prices and 12.4 percent increase in trade volumes.  In the aggregate freight 
expenditures as a percentage of import value would drop from 4.9 to 3.1 percent, and trade volumes 
would increase by 4.96 percent.  For Latin America, the mean response (across goods and 
exporters) would be a 45.4 percent reduction in shipping prices and 17 percent more trade.  In the 
aggregate, freight expenditures as a percentage of import value would drop from 5.9 to 2.8 percent, 
resulting in 21.1 percent more trade. 
 
II. The Model 
In this section we develop a simple model of trade in which shippers have market power and 
set an optimal shipping price as a function of market and product characteristics.  We assume a 
fixed number of shippers which compete in quantities (à la Cournot), and relate optimal markups to 
the number of firms, the price elasticity of import demand, and the cost share of transportation 
services in the delivered price of the traded good.   
This approach abstracts from a potentially important real world complication.  The 
international shipping industry has numerous components including inland freight services, ports, 
and ocean shipping lines.  In some markets port services are highly competitive while in others 
monopoly power reigns.  A trade route may exhibit very little market power in the pricing of the 
shipping lines or freight forwarders, yet substantial market power can be found at the port level.  
Without knowing the details of market microstructure for every market and every product it is 
exceptionally difficult to sort out precisely where market power, if any, is exerted.  Accordingly, we 
examine shipping as an integrated value chain, examine shipping prices paid over the entire chain 
and relate these to product characteristics.  While this loses some of the institutional richness of the   7 
transportation industry it allows us to focus on an object – total transportation charges – that is of 
most interest from the perspective of a firm deciding to engage in international trade.  
 
Assumptions 
The world consists of i=1,2,…, M symmetric countries each of which consists of one 
representative consumer.  Consumers have quasi-linear preferences defined over a homogenous 
numeraire good and varieties of a good that consumers regard as Armington differentiated by 
national origin, with a price elasticity of demand σ .  A representative consumer in country i has a 











= +∑                   1 σ > , 
where   0 i q – is country i's consumption of the numeraire;  
  ij q  – is country i's consumption of a variety purchased from source country j. 
The price of the numeraire is normalized to one and it can be traded at no cost.  Goods from 
country j are sold at price  j p  which shipping firms take as given.
6 The delivered price of traded 
varieties includes a per-unit transportation price, ij f , and the ad-valorem tariff rate, 1 ij τ ≥ : 
(2)  ij j ij ij p p f τ = + .               
Transportation prices are set by shipping firms and are taken as given by consumers. The 
exclusive rights on shipping from country i to j belong to  ij n symmetric firms.  Each firm’s 
technology is defined by the fixed cost  ij C  and marginal cost  ij c .   
 
Shipping prices in trade equilibrium 
We begin by solving for import demand for good k imported from country j.  Consumers 
purchase quantities of each good that set the ratio of marginal utilities equal to the ratio of delivered 
                                                 
6 This is equivalent to assuming that the Armington good is produced by a perfectly competitive, constant returns to 
scale sector requiring  j p  units of labor to produce one unit of the good.  Alternatively, it is as if the shipping firm is 
buying an intermediate input at price  j p from country-producer, adds shipping services, and sells it as a final product to 
a country consumer.    8 














, which gives us the demand for j’s variety:
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Using this we can calculate the price elasticity of demand for shipping services in the 














The key point is that transportation services are not valued for their own sake, and are only 
consumed indirectly as a function of import demand.  The price elasticity of demand for shipping 
services equals the elasticity of import demand with respect to a change in import prices, σ , 









.   
A 1% increase in the shipping price  ij f  raises the delivered price of the good by ij s  percent.  
An  ij s  percent change in delivered prices then yields a  ij s σ −  reduction in import (and therefore 
transport) demand.  When ij s is small, shippers can raise shipping prices at the margin without 
having a large effect on demand for their services.  This is true even if σ  is very high and trade 
itself is highly sensitive to changes in delivered prices.  For example, take an import demand 
elasticity near the upper bound of our estimated elasticities from the next section,  25 σ = , meaning 
that a 1% increase in import prices reduces import quantities by 25%.   If  .10 ij s = , a 1% increase in 
the shipping price lowers shipping demand by only 2.5%.  In other words, even goods that face 
highly elastic import demands might still face significant markups by the shippers.   
                                                 
7 This differs from a standard CES demand because we are calculating demands for each good relative to the numeraire 
rather than relative to a basket of other varieties.  In the case without a numeraire, this expression would include a CES 
price index that is specific to an importer.  Our empirical estimates control for importer specific effects, which can be 
read as the price of the numeraire for our function, or as the level of the CES price index for the more standard case 
without a numeraire.   9 
We can now calculate the optimal shipping prices for our n oligopolists.  The profit 
functions of shipper l delivering from country j to country i is:  
( )
l l
ij ij ij ij ij Q f c C π = − −                   1,2,..., ij l n ∀ = , 
where 
l
ij Q  denotes the quantity of a differentiated variety transported by shipping firms l from j to i, 
and  ij n  is the number of shipping firms on the route from j to i.  The  1 ij n ×  vector of the first order 
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The total amount shipped from i to j equals the aggregate demand of country i for variety produced 
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The second summand is a marginal profit of shipping, which is independent of the fixed cost of 















The term  ij ij s n σ  measures the elasticity of demand facing each of the n firms. For the case of a 
monopolist, it is precisely equal to the elasticity facing the shipping industry as a whole,  ij s σ .  
















.   10 
The markup depends on route-specific and product-specific determinants.  Markups are decreasing 
in the number of shippers on a route  ij n , the final product’s price elasticity of demand σ , and the 
marginal costs of shipping relative to product prices inclusive of tariffs,  / ij j ij c p τ .  We discuss the 
intuition for each in turn. 
  There are large differences across trade routes in the number of shipping firms competing 
for cargo – see Figure 1.  When comparing shipping prices across routes, equation (10) indicates 
that the number of shipping firms has a potentially large effect on the markup rule and shipping 
prices.  Consider a good with median elastic import demand ( 5 σ = ) and suppose that the marginal 
costs of shipping relative to product prices inclusive of tariffs,  .05 ij j ij c p τ = .  With a monopoly 








 times the marginal costs of shipping, 









, resulting in a 16.7% ad-valorem trade barrier.   
Even fixing n along a particular route, markups will vary considerably since  / ij j ij c p τ  and 
σ  might vary across goods.  Shipping firms markups depend on how elastic is import demand with 
respect to a change in shipping prices.  As  / ij j ij c p τ  rises, a given shipping markup has a larger 
effect on delivered goods prices and reduces import and transport demand to a greater degree.  
Similarly, high values of σ  mean that a given increase in delivered goods prices reduces import and 
transport demand more rapidly, limiting the optimal markups that can be charged. 
To formalize our test of market power in the shipping industry we need to assume a 
particular functional form for the marginal cost of transportation so we can relate the markup rule to 
observable characteristics.  Let the marginal cost of shipping depend on the distance between 
countries i and j, and on the price of the shipped good, according to   
(11)  ( )( ) ( )
1 2
0 exp ij j ij c p dist
β β
β = . 
The effect of distance on costs is obvious, but prices are a bit more subtle.  While we have ignored 
the quality of shipping services to this point, when confronting the data it is important to realize that 
there is a wide range of transport service quality available to exporters.  Faster ships, direct routing, 
and more careful handling are all available at a premium, and are more likely to be demanded for 
the transport of higher quality goods.  In addition, our data on shipping costs include insurance   11 
charges which surely depend on the value of the good being transported.  Plugging this into the 
markup equation we have 



















  Equations (11) and (12) make clear the difficulty with an approach used in the literature to 
test for shipping market power.  Several papers simply regress shipping prices on goods prices and 
conclude that a positive coefficient indicates the presence of market power.  If  1 1 β = , marginal 
shipping costs depend on goods prices but the markup does not.  If  1 0 β = , the markup depends on 
goods prices, but marginal costs do not.  For values between 0 and 1, both marginal costs and the 
markup are affected by goods prices. 
Unlike goods prices, tariffs  ij τ  and the elasticity of import demand σ appear only in the 
markup equation.  These variables should only affect shipping prices if firms are able to exercise 
market power.  Moreover, the elasticity of shipping prices with respect to  ij τ  and σ  depends on the 
number of firms, and approaches zero as n grows large.  On the limit the markup converges to one 
and shipping prices equal marginal costs.  The alternative hypothesis for our empirical tests is that 
ij n  is sufficiently large that shipping prices are independent of  ij τ  and σ .   
We can now summarize the relationship between the components of shipping prices 
(marginal cost and markups) and observable characteristics, holding the number of firms fixed.  
These comparative statics can be thought of as a short run response of shipping prices to changes in 
exogenous variables before entry / exit of shipping firms occurs in the long run.  Alternatively, one 
can think of the comparative statics as describing variation in shipping prices across different kinds 
of goods along the same shipping route.  That is, the number of firms shipping goods between 
Brazil and the United States is fixed at a point in time, but there is still variation across goods on the 
Brazil-US route in goods prices, tariffs, and the elasticity of substitution. 
The signs of the model’s comparative statics are reported in the first two columns of Table 
2, with the contrasting case of marginal cost pricing reported in the final two columns.  Marginal 
costs are increasing functions of goods prices and distance as given by equation (11).  The markup   12 
is increasing in the factory price and tariff, and decreasing in distance
8, number of firms, and price 
elasticity of demand.  In the empirical work we examine the elasticity of shipping prices with 
respect to the changes in the observed variables, and given the functional form of (10) there are 
important interactions between the variables.  In particular, the elasticity of the shipping price with 
respect to  k σ  is decreasing in  ij n  and decreasing in  / ij j ij c p τ .  
 
III.  Empirics 
  In this section we relate shipping prices to product characteristics to test for the existence of 
market power in shipping.  The precise functional form implied by our model is difficult to capture 
empirically as it involves nonlinear interactions between the levels of variables we are unable to 
measure exactly.  In particular, we know some correlates of marginal costs (product price, distance), 
but not the intercept or other factors like product bulkiness or special handling requirements.  
Accordingly, we use a simple log linear expression and interactions meant to capture the sign of the 
comparative statics summarized in Table 2.  We use two data samples, and exploit somewhat 
different sources of variation in the two cases. 
  The first data sample comes from the US Census Imports of Merchandise, years 1991-2004.  
We employ data on US imports in each year t, disaggregated by exporter j, product k (HS 6 digit 
data which includes roughly 5,000 product categories) and transport mode m (air, ocean).  We 
observe value, weight, duties paid, and shipment charges for each j-k-m-t observation.  We only 
employ ocean shipping data, and hereafter drop the mode m subscript. 
  We run several specifications.  The first is 
 
(13)  1 2 3 ln ln ln jkt jt jkt jkt k jkt f p e α β β τ β σ = + + + +  
 
where  jkt f  is the freight price per kg shipped,  jkt p is the value/kg price of the good,  jkt τ  is the ad-
valorem tariff,  k σ  is the elasticity of import demand, and  jt α  is a vector of exporter-time fixed 
effects.  This is equivalent to holding fixed the number of shipping firms between the US and 
exporter j and exploiting only variation across product characteristics.  It also holds fixed many 
                                                 
8 Distance is an interesting variable since it directly raises marginal costs but indirectly lowers the markup.  As distance 
increases the share of shipping charge in the delivered price goes up, shippers pricing behavior has a stronger effect on 
total demand and this limits their market power.  The magnitude of the direct effect outweighs the indirect effect.   13 
difficult to capture features of the shipping industry that are exporter specific, including cargo 
reservation policies (Fink et al 2000), the strength of liner conference activity (Fink et al 2000, 
Clyde and Reitzes 1995), and port efficiency (Wilmsmeier et al 2006, Blonigen and Wilson, 2006, 
Clark et al 2004). 
  In the second specification, we omit exporter fixed effects and include data on the number of 
shippers operating on a route, both in levels and interacted with the price elasticity of demand. 
 
(14)  1 2 3 4 5 6 ln ln ln jkt jkt jkt k j j j k jkt f p DIST n n e α β β τ β σ β β β σ = + + + + + + +  
 
All variables except the number of shippers and the elasticity of import demand are taken 
directly from the US import data.   The number of shippers is calculated using the Port2Port 
Evaluation Tool from www.compairdata.com.  This database reports shipping schedules for each 
vessel carrying cargo between each port-port pair worldwide, including the liner company or 
consortium operating each vessel.  From this we calculate the number of distinct companies 
operating on each route.  The data were collected for the 4
th quarter of 2006, and cover shipping 
schedules in that period.  We do not have time series data for the number of shippers and so treat it 
as constant for a given exporter to the US over the sample period.  For reference, Figure 1 displays a 
scatterplot of (log) number of firms against (log) exporter GDP.   
Not all exporters have direct connections to US seaports and so do not appear in the 
schedule data.  In these cases we impute the number of firms using information on indirect routings.  
For example, there is a service between Singapore and the US but no direct shipments between 
Kenya or Tanzania and the US.  These exporters must first ship goods to ports in Singapore where 
they are aggregated into larger ships and sent along to the US.  For exporters with no direct service 
to the US we use the number of shippers between the origin ports and the hub ports from which they 
are subsequently shipped to the US.  In our sample there are 52 exporters for which we have direct 
observations on numbers of firms, to which we add 36 more exporters in which we can reasonably 
impute values.  We drop the remaining exporters from our set of US data.  Our tables report results 
that include the imputed data, but we have experimented and our results are very similar when we 
use only those exporters with direct service to the US.   
The elasticity of import demand is a critical variable for our study, so we experiment with 
values taken from two sources.  First, we use estimates of  k σ  at the 3 digit level of Standard   14 
International Trade Classification revision 3 (SITC) taken from Broda-Weinstein (2006).  Their  k σ  
elasticities are estimated using a procedure developed by Feenstra (1994) that exploits time series 
variation in the quantity shares of exporter j selling product k to the US market as a function of time 
series variation in the price of j-k.  Second, we directly estimate  k σ , using trade costs to trace out 
price variation across source countries j quantity shares.  The details on our estimation method are 
contained in the appendix, along with a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of our 
approach relative to Broda-Weinstein, and some summary statistics on the estimated values.  
Briefly, our estimates are more disaggregated, and estimated specifically for the transportation 
mode, country sample, and time period employed in the shipping price regressions.  If 
substitutability varies by level of aggregation, mode, countries or time, the elasticities we estimate 
would be preferred.   When using the BW elasticities we still employ shipping data at the HS 6 level 
so as to avoid aggregating away interesting variation in the  , , and  jkt jkt jkt f p τ  data.  In this case each 
SITC 3 digit estimate of  k σ  is used in multiple HS 6 products.  
Our second data sample comes from the BTI trade database for 2000.
9  In this case we have 
multiple Latin American importers (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay) and 
therefore many importer-exporter pairs, but lack time series variation.  The specifications are 
similar to equations (13) and (14), except that all time “t” subscripts are replaced with importer “i” 
subscripts.  The corresponding equations are 
 
(15)  1 2 3 ln ln ln ijk j ijk ijk k ijk f p e α β β τ β σ = + + + +  
 
(16)  1 2 3 4 5 6 ln ln ln ijk ijk ijk k ij ij ij k ijk f p DIST n n e α β β τ β σ β β β σ = + + + + + + +  
 
In the first specification we control for the number of shippers using a vector of exporter fixed 
effects  j α .  In the second we omit the fixed effects but include data on the number of shippers and 
an interaction with  k σ . 
All variables except  ij n and  k σ come from the BTI data.  As with the US data,  ij n  comes 
from the Port2Port evaluation tool at www.compairdata.com.  Compared to the US case there are 
                                                 
9 We are grateful to Jan Hoffman at UN ECLAC for providing these data.   15 
far fewer exporters for which we either have schedule data directly or can infer reasonable 
substitute exporters to impute values, and this substantially reduces our sample.  We have compared 
estimated elasticities in the fixed effect regressions that omit  ij n for the larger and the reduced 
samples, and coefficients are all very similar except distance, where truncating the sample 
significantly reduces the estimated coefficient.  Since the main variables of interest are robust to the 
two sample types and we wish to maintain comparability of samples across columns we employ the 
smaller samples for all Latin American regressions. 
Because the elasticity of import demand  k σ  may be different in the Latin American and US 
import markets, we estimate values of  k σ  that are specific to this dataset (details in the appendix).  
We also use our estimates of  k σ  from the US data, and Broda-Weinstein estimates of  k σ  from the 
US data, and results are qualitatively similar in each case. 
 
Results 
  Table 3 reports estimates of equations (13) and (14) using US imports data.  The first three 
columns use our elasticities estimated at the HS6 level.  All signs match our theory.  Shipping prices 
are increasing in distance, and in product prices.  As we note above, the positive correlation 
between shipping prices and product prices has been shown elsewhere in the literature and could 
reflect market power if marginal costs of shipping are independent of goods prices.   A much 
stronger test of market power is found in the other variables.  Shipping prices are higher for goods 
with lower import demand elasticities (elasticity -.22 to -.25).  That is, shipping firms are best able 
to take advantage of their position between producer and consumer to increase markups when 
consumption decisions are less sensitive to changes in delivered prices.  Shipping prices are 
increasing in tariffs with an elasticity close to 1, meaning that a 1 percent tariff increase calls forth 
an additional 1 percent increase in shipping costs.  The results on product prices, import demand 
elasticities and tariffs go through whether we use exporter-time fixed effects (and omit distance and 
number of shippers) or omit the fixed effects and enter distance and number of shippers directly.  
Finally, the coefficient on number of shippers operating on a route is negative and the interaction 
between number of shippers and demand elasticity is positive.  This means that that adding more 
shippers to a route directly lowers shipping prices and weakens the ability of firms to charge higher 
markups on goods facing a less elastic import demand.      16 
The last three columns of Table 3 employ SITC 3 digit demand elasticities from Broda-
Weinstein (2006).  The coefficients on the demand elasticity are roughly half the size as those 
estimated with our HS 6 values for k σ , but still negative and highly significant, and all other 
variables have a similar affect on shipping prices.  A likely explanation for the difference in the  k σ  
coefficients is that the Broda-Weinstein elasticities are estimated on more aggregated data and using 
samples which do not exactly match the data in question.  In this case their estimates are noisy 
indicators of the true elasticity of import demand facing shippers, and so the coefficients are subject 
to attenuation bias toward zero. 
  Table 4 reports estimates of equations (15) and (16) using Latin American data.  As with the 
US data shipping prices are increasing in distance, product prices, and tariffs, and decreasing in the 
import demand elasticity, and the number of shippers.  The coefficients on the import demand 
elasticity are comparable in magnitude to those estimated on the US data in Table 3, while the 
coefficients on tariffs and the number of shippers are larger (in absolute magnitudes).   When using 
the BW elasticities the interaction between the import demand elasticity and number of shippers is 
positive, meaning that adding more shippers to a route weakens the ability of firms to charge higher 
markups on goods facing a less elastic import demand.  The interaction term is insignificant in the 
regressions using HS 6  k σ  data, but the net effect of both the number of shippers and the import 
demand elasticity is negative when evaluated at both variables means. 
  The differences between the US and Latin American samples in the tariff and number of 
shippers effects are particularly interesting.  In the US, where tariffs are relatively small, a 1 percent 
increase in tariffs leads to a 1 percent increase in shipping prices.  In Latin America, where tariffs 
are larger and exhibit much greater variation across products, a 1 percent increase in tariffs yields a 
1.3 to 2.1 percent increase in shipping prices.  This suggests that tariff reductions in and of 
themselves could be a useful tool for lowering shipping prices facing Latin American importers.  
US trading routes have higher volumes and more shippers competing than on Latin American trade 
routes.  In this case, doubling the number of shippers reduces shipping costs by 6 to 9 percent.  In 
Latin America, doubling the number of shippers reduces shipping costs by 11 to 15 percent.   
 
The Strength of Market Power  
  Tables 3 and 4 provide strong support for the idea that market power allows shipping firms 
to price discriminate across cargoes, charging higher prices when shipping is a smaller portion of   17 
the delivered price, and when increases in the delivered price will result in a smaller reduction in 
import (and therefore transport) demand.  Next we examine how important market power is relative 
to other factors in explaining variation across goods and exporters in shipping prices. 
In many trade applications distance is used to proxy for transportation costs.  In the US 
sample, Table 3, we see that a 10% increase in distance shipped raises US transportation prices by 
1.5%.  Whether distance explains a large or small portion of total variation in shipping prices 
depends on how much distance varies in the sample.  We can show this by calculating the predicted 
value of shipping prices for exporters at various distances from the US, holding other variables at 
their means.  For example, exporters at 5
th, 50
th and 95
th percentile values of distance are 3233 km, 
8830 km and 13,326 km away from the US, respectively.  The model predicts that, ceteris paribus, 
the exporter at 13,326 km distance faces shipping prices to the US that are 24 percent higher than an 
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, while an exporter at median distance of 
8830 km faces prices 17 percent higher than an exporter at 4880 km.   
How does this variation compare to that induced by the variables that capture market power?  
Table 5 reports the estimated coefficient for each variable taken from the fifth columns of Table 3 
(for the US) and Table 4 (for Latin America) along with the 95
th/5
th percentile comparisons and 
50
th/5




th percentiles – hereafter referred to as “low”, “median” and “high” – are reported in the 
Table notes.   
There is enormous variation across goods in factory prices measured in units of dollars per 
kg (compare microchips to cement), and this results in considerable variation across goods in 
shipping prices.  Goods with high factory prices have shipping prices 18 (Latin America) to 21 (US) 
times greater than goods with low factory prices.  As we argue above, some of the difference in 
shipping prices may reflect differences in the marginal cost of providing shipping services of 
variable quality, but this may also reflect market power effects. 
The elasticity of shipping prices with respect to the import demand elasticity is estimated to 
be -0.10 (for SITC 3 digit  k σ  values) to -0.22 (for HS 6  k σ  values).  In the US data, goods with a 
low elasticity of import demand have shipping prices that are 33 percent (SITC3) to 43 percent 
higher (HS6) than goods with a high elasticity of import demand.  Note that when comparing the 
effect for HS v. SITC, the elasticity of shipping prices with respect to  k σ  is half as big for SITC 3   18 
digit, but the range of SITC 3 digit  k σ  values is larger.  This means that the range of variation in 
shipping prices due to  k σ  variation is comparable whether we use our estimated  k σ  or Broda-
Weinstein’s.  The range of variation in shipping prices explained is similarly comparable for Latin 
America.   
Tariffs exhibit less variation over goods than we see with product prices or import demand 
elasticities.  However, the elasticity of shipping prices with respect to tariffs is much larger.  In the 
US, high tariff goods face shipping prices that are 17 percent greater than low tariff goods.  In Latin 
America, where tariff variation is greater, high tariff goods face shipping prices 36 percent greater 
than low tariff goods.   
Finally, the elasticity of shipping prices with respect to the number of shippers is much 
greater in Latin America than in the US, but there is less variation in the number of shippers.  As a 
result, number of shippers explains a comparable amount of variation in shipping prices in both 
samples.  Exporters with a small number of shippers (1 for the US, 2 for Latin America) face 
shipping prices that are 22-23 percent higher than exporter with a high number of shippers (32 for 
the US, 8 for Latin America). 
Using distance as a proxy for transportation costs has become commonplace, but it explains 
relatively little of the variation in shipping prices.  Each of our variables that clearly indicate market 
power (import demand elasticity, tariffs, number of shippers) has an effect comparable to or larger 
than distance.  Product prices, which likely capture a combination of marginal costs of shipping and 
market power, explain variation in shipping prices an order of magnitude larger than that explained 
by distance variation. 
 
Market Power and Shipping Prices in Developing Countries 
  Table 1 shows that Latin American importers face higher shipping prices than do US 
importers, and developing country exporters face higher shipping prices into most import markets.  
We next use our estimates to identify how much of this effect is due to the exercise of market power 
in the shipping industry.   
First we compare non-OECD to OECD exporters shipping into each import market.  We re-
estimate the model from equations (14) and (16) for the US and Latin American samples, with two   19 
differences.   First, the dependent variable is the ad-valorem (rather than per kg) shipping price.
10  
This makes it easier to think in terms of the effect of shipping on the delivered price of the product, 
and also helps us to explain the observed differences in freight expenditures relative to import 
values reported in Table 1.  Second, we include separate intercepts for OECD and non-OECD 
exporters to capture differences in the level of costs that we cannot attribute to explicitly measured 
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We can now attribute differences between OECD and non-OECD exporters to differences in 
the intercepts plus difference in shipment characteristics, that is, differences in the average product 
price, demand elasticity, tariff, distance, and number of shippers for the two groups.   Table 6 
reports for each variable the mean differences between non-OECD and OECD exporters in the 
explanatory variables.  In the US sample, non-OECD prices are lower,  / .61 non oecd oecd P P − = .  To get 
the difference between shipping prices from OECD and non-OECD exporters attributable to 
differences in product prices, we calculate,  ( ) .47 ln ln .224
non OECD OECD p p
− − − =  and similarly for 
each explanatory variable.  Summing over all the differences in explanatory variables, plus the 
difference in the intercept, yields the total difference in mean shipping prices facing OECD and 
non-OECD exporters. 
                                                 
10 Coefficients on all variables except product prices are the same whether shipping prices are expressed on a per kg, or 
on an ad-valorem basis.  Since we have effectively subtracted ln(p) from both sides, the coefficient on product prices in 
the ad-valorem regression is -1 smaller than in the per kg regressions.  That is, higher product prices result in higher per 
kg shipping prices with an elasticity of roughly 0.5, and lower ad-valorem shipping prices with an elasticity of roughly  
-0.5.   20 
  For the US, ad valorem shipping prices from non-OECD exporters are 1.48 times shipping 
prices from OECD exporters (log difference equal to .393).  Of this, 57 percent comes from OECD 
exporters having higher prices, 7 percent comes from OECD exporters being served by more 
shippers and 5 percent comes from OECD exporters being closer to the US.
11  Most of the 
remaining difference, or 34 percent, represents higher non-OECD shipping prices conditional on the 
other variables.  The import demand elasticity plays very little role here because the average values 
for the elasticity are quite similar for the OECD and non-OECD.  
For the Latin American import sample, non-OECD exporters have shipping prices 1.39 
times larger than OECD exporters (log difference of .327). Of this, two-thirds come from OECD 
exporters shipping higher priced goods, and the remaining third comes form the OECD intercept. 
  Next we decompose the difference in shipping prices into the US import market compared 
to the Latin American import markets.  To decompose the sources of this difference we first 
estimate equation (14) on a pooled sample for the US and Latin America in 2000,  
￿
ln 3.10 .10ln .47ln 1.14ln .12ln .076ln
ijk












Latin American importers face shipping prices that are, on average, 1.257 times that of the US as 
importer (log difference .228).  Half of this difference is due to Latin American importers imposing 
higher tariffs on goods, one-third is due to the smaller number of shipping firms operating on Latin 
American routes, 13 percent is due to Latin American countries being further from their export 
sources, and 4 percent is due to the US buying higher priced products. 
 
Trade Volumes: A Back of the Envelope Calculation 
As a final exercise we calculate the reduction in trade volumes that results from shipping 
firms pricing above marginal cost.  Starting from the import demand equation (3), express the actual 
volume of trade relative to a counterfactual quantity of trade that would taken place had shipping 
firms priced at marginal cost 
                                                 
11 China is a large outlier in the number of shippers serving the market.  If we drop China from the calculation, the 
number of shippers serving non-OECD/OECD markets = 0.41 and number of shippers explains 10 percent of the 
difference in shipping costs.   21 
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where  s q
∗ is the counterfactual quantity of trade with marginal cost shipping prices, and the 
subscript s denotes shipment.  The dimensionality of this variable depends on the data in question.  
For our Latin American data, s represents importer i, exporter j, commodity k.  For the US data, s 
represents exporter j, commodity k, time t.   
We do not observe the marginal cost of shipping, but we can approximate it by manipulating 
our empirical specification for shipping prices.    The shipping price for shipment s is empirically 
specified in equations (14) and (16).  Ignoring the interaction term the equation can be rewritten as 
 
(17) 
3 5 1 4 2 s
s s s s s s f e p DIST n e
β β ε β β β α τ σ =  
 
Three variables, the elasticity of import demand, tariff, and the number of shippers affect only the 
markup.  That is to say, theoretically the shipping price equals marginal cost only if the elasticity 
and the number of shippers are infinitely large and tariff is equal to one.  We approximate this by 
choosing very large (99
th percentile) values for the import demand elasticity and the number of 
shippers and very small values (1
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The error term from the estimation is equal to the actual shipping price relative to the fitted shipping 
price from the empirical model, or 
3 5 1 2 4
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Strictly speaking the term in brackets is not precisely the shipping markup over marginal cost.  
Rather it is the ratio of the observed values 
3 5 2
s s s n
β β β τ σ that affect markups for a particular shipment s   22 
and the values for the smallest markup we can see in our data 
3 5 2
1% 99% 99% n
β β β τ σ .  The true markup over 
marginal cost for shipment s must be at least this large. 






























This calculation provides a conservative estimate of the size of the markup and the 
corresponding effect on trade volumes.  First, we attribute all of the effect of higher product prices 
on higher shipping prices to marginal cost differences and none to markup differences.  Second, we 
choose values for  ,n σ  that are at the high end of those observed in the data, rather than choosing 
some infinite value.  The counterfactual is then equivalent to the following:  suppose all shipments 
were charged the same markup as the smallest observed markup in the data.  How much lower 
would shipping prices be, and how much higher would be the resulting trade volumes? 
The summary of estimated markups and counterfactual trade volumes amounts of trade are 
as follows.   For US imports, shipping prices for the mean shipment are 1.53 times higher than 
prices for the lowest markup shipment (standard deviation of 0.23).  In ad-valorem terms shipping 
markups result in delivered prices that are 1.024 times higher for the mean shipment (stdev = .03), 
resulting in trade volumes that are 12.4 percent lower.  These calculations weight all observations 
equally, and the aggregate results are somewhat smaller.  Aggregate freight expenditures as a 
percentage of imports would drop by 1.8 percentage points, from 4.9 to 3.1 percent ad-valorem, if 
shipping prices for each shipment were lowered to reflect the smallest observed markup.  This 
would lead to a 4.96 percent increase in trade.
13 
For Latin American imports, shipping prices for the mean shipment are 1.83 times higher 
than prices for the lowest markup shipment, with a standard deviation of .28.  In ad-valorem terms 
                                                 
12 Our trade volume calculation employs a useful property of the quasi-linear utility function we initially assumed.  
Lowering delivered prices by 1 percent yields a σ  percentage increase in trade volumes even if all exporters have 
similar price declines.  That is, expenditures on the imported goods grow while expenditures on the numeraire shrink.  
In a standard model with CES utility over the imported goods and no numeraire, changes in delivered prices would shift 
expenditures from one exporting source relative to another, or relative to the domestic versions of the imported good. 
13 The “before” aggregate ad-valorem numbers do not match those from Table 1 for two reasons.  One, we focus here 
only on waterborne shipments.  Two, due to data availability constraints we have reduced the sample of countries and 
goods on which this calculation can be performed.   23 
shipping markups result in delivered prices that are 1.038 times higher for the mean shipment (stdev 
=.06), resulting in trade volumes that are 17 percent lower.  Aggregate results are somewhat larger.  
Aggregate freight expenditures as a percentage of imports would drop by 3.1 percentage points, 
from 5.9% to 2.8%, if shipping prices for each shipment were lowered to reflect the smallest 
observed markup.  This would lead to a 21.1% percent increase in trade. 
  Shipping prices inclusive of markups are much larger (53 percent for US imports, 83 percent 
for Latin America) than would be observed for the shipment with the smallest markup, which 
implies that the total markup is larger still.  Is this plausible?   Recall from the modeling section 
(p.9-10) that, for a monopoly shipper, markups 6 times marginal cost can be generated under 




Many recent papers have focused on the importance of transportation costs, or more simply 
distance, in shaping trade flows.  A common feature of these papers is the assumption of Samuelson 
iceberg shipping cost in which ad-valorem shipping costs are treated as an exogenous constant, and 
most typically captured solely by the distance between markets.  We get inside the black box of the 
transportation industry to show how the exercise of market power drives much of the variation in 
shipping prices.   
Our test of market power in the shipping industry focuses on the ability of shipping firms to 
price discriminate across products.  The elasticity of demand facing a shipping firm is a function of 
the elasticity of import demand and the degree to which changes in shipping prices affect the final 
delivery price of a product.  Shippers can charge especially large markups on goods whose import 
demand is relatively inelastic, and on those goods where the marginal cost of shipping represents a 
small percentage of delivered prices.  That is, increases in factory gate product prices and increases 
in tariffs give shippers more room to price discriminate.  Further, a larger number of shipping firms 
competing on a route lowers both the level of shipping prices and the ability of firms to price 
discriminate across products.   
These theoretical predictions are strongly supported by shipping data taken from US and 
Latin American imports.  Shipping prices are increasing in product prices and tariffs, and 
decreasing in the elasticity of import demand the number of shippers on a route.  Each of these   24 
market power variables has an impact on shipping prices equal to or greater than the effect of 
shipping cargoes greater distances.   
Our findings suggest that high transportation costs in the developing world are not an 
unfortunate technological fact of life, and provide two important policy implications.   First, 
because the demand facing the shipping industry as whole can be highly inelastic even a little entry 
can go a long way in reducing market power and markups in shipping.  The recent decision by the 
EU Competitiveness Council to bar shipping firms from participating in liner conferences and from 
colluding on price and market share agreements is worth watching in this regard.  Second, high 
tariffs are especially harmful to trade.  They directly increase the delivered price of traded goods 
and indirectly lead to increased shipping markups.  We estimate that a 1% increase in tariffs leads to 
a 1-2% increase in transportation costs.  This effect is especially pronounced in Latin America 
where tariffs are much larger and more variable to begin with.  Cutting these tariffs would yield a 
double dose of trade growth for liberalizing countries. 
   25 
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Appendix:  Estimating the Price Elasticity of Demand for Imports 
 
  A key parameter for our study is the import elasticity of demand  k σ  and its variance over 
products.  This parameter can be thought of either as the own-price elasticity of demand for a 
particular good from a particular exporter, or as the degree of substitutability between varieties of 
good k being exported from two or more distinct exporters. 
  Identifying  k σ  requires us to estimate the slope of a demand curve using some variation in 
prices.  Broda-Weinstein (2006) estimate values for  k σ  using a procedure developed by Feenstra 
(1994) to analyze a simultaneous system of export supply and import demand.  The procedure 
exploits time series variation in the quantity shares of exporter j selling product k to the US market 
as a function of time series variation in the price of j-k.  This approach has advantages and 
disadvantages.  One advantage is that it allows for slope in the export supply curve rather than 
assuming that exporters have a constant marginal cost.  A disadvantage is that the parameters of 
interest are only identified if there are no simultaneous shocks to the error terms in the supply and 
demand equations.  The necessary identifying assumption would be violated if, for example, the 
quality of a given product k varies over time for an exporter.  Nevertheless, the Broda-Weinstein 
estimates seem sensible, and are becoming something of an industry standard for studies that 
require an estimate of the price elasticity of import demand. 
  We employ BW values while also estimating  k σ  values of our own using a different 
identification method.  Our method follows Hummels (2001) and identifies the slope of the import 
demand curve using variation in trade costs.  It allows us to better match our estimates of  k σ  to the 
level of aggregation, transportation mode, country sample, and time period that we employ in our 
shipping price regressions.  If  k σ  varies across level of aggregation, mode, country or period, our 
estimates will provide better information about the elasticity of import demand facing a shipping 
firm as it makes pricing decisions. 
  Our identification technique works as follows.  Equation (3) in the text captures quantity 
demanded by a single representative consumer in importer j for a single variety from exporter j.  











  =   −  
 






φ τ = +  is total ad-valorem trade costs.  In the case where 
product quality varies across exporting sources, this can be further augmented to include a price-
equivalent quality shifter of the form. 
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Trade flows between individual consumers and firms are not observable in our data, so to get 
something observable (total imports in product k between exporter j and importer i) we multiply   27 
both sides by the number of varieties produced by an exporter and the total expenditures of an 
importer and take logs  
 
(22)  ( ) ln ln ln ln ln ln ijk i jk k jk k jk k ijk Q a Y n p σ λ σ σ φ = + + + − −  
 
where  ijk jk ijk Q n q = are total quantities traded.  In our Latin American data we have many importer 
i-exporter j pairs for each product k.  This allows us to run a separate regression for each k (an HS 6 
good) of the form 
 
(23)  ( ) ln ln ijk k ik jk ijk ijk Q a e α α σ φ = + + − +  
 
In this case, the value of  k σ is identified off the bilateral variation in trade costs.  The exporter fixed 
effects eliminate exporter j-product k specific variation in product prices, and unobserved variation 
in the number of varieties and product quality.  The importer fixed effects eliminate importer i-
product k variation in real expenditures.  In our simple model with quasi-linear utility this is just 
real incomes since all prices are written relative to a numeraire.  In the more common model with 
CES preferences there would be an additional CES price index that is i-k specific, but such a term 
would be differenced out of the estimation of (23) in any case. 
  A key difference between BW and our technique is that BW is identified off price variation 
in the time series, assuming that there are no simultaneous shocks to the supply and demand 
equations as would be caused by changing quality over time.  If quality is changing over time then 
we have the classical simultaneity problem in estimating a demand curve off of prices – there is an 
unobserved term (quality) that is positively correlated with both supply prices and demand quantity.  
This biases estimates of  k σ toward zero. 
  Because we have multiple importers for each exporter, we can control for exporter-specific 
quality variation using a fixed effect.  In this case, we eliminate prices from the equation, but we 
can still identify  k σ through the variation in trade costs. 
This approach assumes that, for a given HS 6 good k, exporters send identical quality levels 
to each importer.  Suppose instead that quality is i-j-k specific.  In this case we must rewrite 
equation (22) as  
   ( ) ln ln ln ln ln ln ijk i jk k ijk k ijk k ijk Q a Y n p σ λ σ σ φ = + + + − −  
Our estimating equation becomes  
(24)  ( ) 1 ln ln ln ijk k ik jk k ijk ijk ijk Q a p e α α β σ φ = + + + − +  
 
and the coefficient on prices is biased due to unobserved (ijk specific) quality variation that shifts 
out demand and is correlated with prices.  However, our measure of trade costs still cleanly 
identifies  k σ .  We use equation (24) to estimate  k σ for each HS 6 product in the Latin American 
imports data. 
  For the US imports we do not have multiple importers but we do have a time series and we 
have multiple (HS 10) observations per HS6 product.  Rewriting  (22) to reflect this we have 
 
( ) , , , ln ln ln ln ln ln jt g k t jtk k jtk k jt g k k jt g k q a Y n p σ λ σ σ φ ∈ ∈ ∈ = + + + − −    28 
 
Where  g k ∈ means that we pool over all HS 10 products g within a given HS 6 classification, and 
we assume that exporter quality and number of varieties are symmetric within an HS 6.  We can 
then estimate this separately for each HS6 and use exporter fixed effects to yield 
 
(25)  ( ) , 1 , , ln ln ln jt g k t jk k jt g k k jt g k q a p α β σ φ ∈ ∈ ∈ = + + −  
 
Using an exporter fixed effect eliminates the time-invariant components of quality, prices, and 
number of varieties.  If we believed that quality was time invariant, as in Broda-Weinstein, we 
could read the coefficient directly off the price term to get  k σ .  If we do not believe this, we can 
still read the coefficient in front of trade costs to get  k σ . 
  We can either use quantities on the left hand side of equations (24) and (25), or we can 
multiply by both sides of the equation and use values.  This increases the predicted coefficient on 
prices by 1, but does not otherwise change the estimating equation.  We use import values since 
they tend to be measured with less noise than import quantities.   
  In the US imports data, after we restricted our attention to the HS 6-digit categories with at 
least 50 observations we were left with 4756 separate estimates of elasticity.  Out of these, we are 
able to estimate elasticities in the theoretically sensible range (smaller than -1) and statistically 
significant in 3750 cases.  Using quantities as a dependent variable instead yields only 2321 usable 
estimates, but the correlation coefficient of 0.88 between these and the elasticities estimated using 
values as a dependent variable.  Similarly for Latin America, we start with 4585 goods for which we 
have at least 50 observations, and estimate statistically significant elasticities smaller than -1 in 
2877 cases. 
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= =Table 1 The Importance of Transportation Costs. 
 
  US  Argentina  Bolivia  Brazil  Chile  Ecuador  Paraguay  Peru  Uruguay 
Aggregate freight expenditures 
































































Freight bill as a % of total trade costs (1)  
 
85%  31.3%  45.7%  31.0%  42.4%  45.5%  63.0%  39.5%  31.5% 
 
Coefficient of variation in ad-valorem 
transportation costs across goods (2) 
 
1.4  5.24  1.83  1.34  1.70  1.68  1.64  1.28  1.59 
Coefficient of variation in ad-valorem 
transportation costs across exporters (3) 
 




(1)  For each importer, calculate ad-valorem transportation expenditures for each exporter j-HS6 product k as  / / jk jk jk jk jk g f p F PQ = = .  Ad-valorem tariff is 
jk τ .   /( ) jk jk jk g g τ + is freight bill as a percentage of total trade costs for each exporter j-HS6 product k.  Table entry reports median values of this statistic (over all 
j-k) for each importer. 
(2)  The Coefficient of variation is c.o.v.( ) ( )/ ( ) jk jk jk g stdev g mean g = .  Table reports median value of c.o.v.( ) jk g  over all jk for each importer. 
(3) For each importer, calculate ad-valorem transportation expenditures for each exporter j-HS6 product k, relative to product k means as  ( )/( ) jk jk k h g g = .  The 
coefficient of variation is c.o.v.( ) ( )/ ( ) jk jk jk h stdev h mean h = .  The table reports median values of c.o.v.( ) jk h over all jk for each importer. 
 
 




Oligopoly with fixed 
number of firms 
 
Marginal cost pricing  
  Marginal Cost   Markup  Marginal Cost  Markup 
Import Demand 
Elasticity σ   0  -  0  0 
Distance,  ij d   +  -  +  0 
Factory price,  j p   +  +  +  0 
Tariff, 1 ij τ +   0  +  0  0 
Number of shipping 
firms,  ij n   0  -  0  0 
Interaction Term, 
ij n σ ×   0  +  0  0 
 
  
Table 3.  Ocean Cargo Prices and Market Power, US Imports 
 
Dependent variable:  Ocean Shipping Costs per Kilogram ln jtk f  
 
 
HS 6 demand elasticities 
(our estimates) 
 
SITC 3 digit demand elasticities 
(Broda-Weinstein) 
Product Price 














































  ( ) ln j n  
  -.06 
(.001) 
-.09 





( ) ( ) ln ln j k n σ ×       .02 
(.002)      .03 
(.002) 
Distance 
( ) ln j dist     .17 
(.002) 
.17 





fixed effects  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No 
Adj-R
2  .47  .48  .48  .48  .48  .48 




1.  Table contains estimates of equations (13) and (14), data from US Imports of Merchandise, ocean-
borne imports only.  See appendix for estimation procedure for import demand elasticities. 
2.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
3.  Sample includes only those exporters for which data on “n” are available.  
Table 4.  Ocean Cargo Prices and Market Power, Latin American Imports 
 
Dependent variable:  Ocean Shipping Costs per Kilogram ln ijk f  
 
HS 6 demand elasticities 
(our estimates) 
SITC 3 digit demand elasticities 
(Broda-Weinstein) 
Product Price 












































  ( ) ln ij n  
  -.13 
(.004) 
-.11 





( ) ( ) ln ln ij k n σ ×  
    -.008 
(.007) 
    .012 
(.006) 
Distance 
( ) ln ij dist  










Yes   No  No  Yes  No  No 
adj-R
2  .59  .58  .58  .58  .57  .57 
n-obs  61,053  61,053  61,053  75,532  75,532  75,532 
 
Notes: 
1.  Table contains estimates of equations (15) and (16), data from BTI database, ocean-borne imports 
only.  See appendix for estimation procedure for import demand elasticities. 
2.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
3.  Sample includes only those exporters for which data on “n” are available.  
 Table 5  Explaining Variation in Shipping Costs per kg 




















Estimated Elasticity  .54  -.10  -.22  1.17  -.06  .15 
 
50 5 ( )/ ( ) pctile pctile f X f X
 
8.50  .92  .80  1.03  .85  1.17 
 
95 5 ( )/ ( ) pctile pctile f X f X
 
 
20.91  .75  .70  1.17  .81  1.24 
 


















Estimated Elasticity  .51  -0.104  -0.195  1.48  -.14  .028 
 
50 5 ( )/ ( ) pctile pctile f X f X
 
 
5.75  .92  .85  1.19  .88   1.03 
 
95 5 ( )/ ( ) pctile pctile f X f X
 
 
18.36  .79  .70  1.36  .82  1.06 
Notes: 
1.  Estimated elasticities taken from 5
th columns of Tables 3,4  
2.  For each column calculate the predicted freight rate for 5
th, 50
th, and 95
th percentile values of the explanatory 
variable weighted by value of trade, holding other variables at means.   50 5 ( )/ ( ) pctile pctile f X f X  then reports 
the ratio of freight rates at the 50
th and 5
th percentiles. 
3. The values of each variable at (5th,50th, and 95th) percentiles are:  Import demand elasticity (SITC 3digit) – 
US (1.23, 2.69, 22.15), LA (1.22, 2.69, 11.37); Import demand elasticity (HS 6) – US (3.23, 9.10, 16.50), 
LA(3.53,8.09,21.85); Tariff –  US (1,1.02,1.17), LA (1,1.12,1.23); Product price –  US (0.14, 7.66, 40.66), LA 
(0.13, 4.06, 39.56);  Distance – US (3233, 8830, 13326), LA (2344, 7915, 18372); Number of shippers – US (1, 
15, 32), LA (2,5,8). 
4. 99
th percentile elasticity of substitution (estimated at SITC 3digit) for Latin America and for US is 25.03.  
Table 6.  Decomposing Differences in Shipping Costs by Income Level 
 











Tariff  Number of 
shippers  Distance 
 
 
US Imports Shipment Characteristics: 
non-OECD exporter means / OECD exporter means 
/ non OECD OECD X X −   1.48    0.61  1.02  0.995  0.52  1.16 
Contribution to 
fitted values 
























Latin American Imports Shipment Characteristics:   
non-OECD exporter means/OECD exporter means 
/ non OECD OECD X X −   1.39    0.63  0.94  1.01  1.14  1.17 
Contribution to 
fitted values 
























Shipment Characteristics:  
Latin America Imports Mean/ US Imports Mean 
/ LA US X X   1.257    .98  .97  1.10  .38  1.28 
Contribution to 
fitted values 





















Notes:   
1.  Difference in predicted non-OECD freight rate attributable to product price is calculated as  ( ) ln ln
non OECD OECD
p p p β
− − .  
2.  Calculations based on these regressions (all coefficients significant at 1%, SITC 3 elasticities 
US imports:  ( ) ln / 3.66 .18OECD .11n .47ln 1.14n .18ln .04ln t f p p DIST n α σ τ = − − − − + + − .  
Latin American:  ( ) ln / 1.99 .11 .10ln .48ln 1.38ln .02ln .15ln f p OECD p DIST n σ τ = − − − − + + −  
US v. Latin America imports: ln( / ) 3.10 .10ln .47ln 1.14ln .12ln .076ln f p p DIST n σ τ = − − + + −   
 
 
  
  
 